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Abstract
The Arctic states are bound in an institutional relationship by means of their actions through the
Arctic Council (AC)*an organisation created by the eight Arctic states. Although a number of its
European Union (EU) states are both members and observers in the AC, the EU is not, despite its
clear stake in the Arctic, for of a number of reasons. The AC twice postponed the application of the
EU in 2013; however, it granted the EU the right to observe the AC meetings as an ‘‘observer in
principle.’’ In addition to the significant resource and commercial interests of the EU in the Arctic, it
assumes a stewardship role in the Arctic. As the leader in combating global climate change, for
example, the EU is committed to assuming responsibility for protecting the Arctic environment
given that climate change does have a devastating impact in the Arctic. Moreover, the EU is also
concerned about its and continental Europe’s only indigenous people, the Sa´mi, a significant pro-
portion of whom live in its Arctic member states of Finland and Sweden. Thus, in recent years,
the EU has endorsed a series of policy documents concerning the Arctic. Against the background of
this development, this article examines whether the policy responses of the Arctic states with regard
to the EU’s increased ambition to engage in Arctic matters make it a legitimate actor or stakeholder.
The article concludes that even though the Arctic states, as the primary actors, determine the region’s
governance approach, they see also a general partnership role for the EU with regard to the common
goals of knowledge-based responsible governance and sustainable development of the Arctic.
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1. Introduction
Since the end of past decade, the European Union (EU) has started showing notable
interest in the Arctic. While this focus is motivated in part by the resource-oriented
and commercial ambitions of the EU in the region, it also*and perhaps more
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importantly*reflects a concern over the rapid climate change occurring in the
region. As the leader in combating global climate change, the EU is committed to
assuming responsibility for protecting the Arctic environment. Climate change will
have a devastating impact not only in the Arctic but also globally; for example,
melting ice in the Arctic, in particular the Greenlandic ice sheet, is causing sea levels
to rise. In addition, the EU is concerned about its and continental Europe’s only
indigenous people, the Sa´mi, a significant proportion of whom live in its Arctic
member states*Finland and Sweden*and the protection of whose rights falls
within the ambit of the EU’s policy priorities.
It is in light of these commitments that the EU has developed a policy of its own
towards the Arctic. It has concluded bilateral and multilateral cooperation arrange-
ments with a number of states located in the region. While the EU considers the
Arctic Council (AC) as the primary intergovernmental body in the region, it has not
been admitted as a formal observer in the Council. The AC has twice postponed the
EU’s application for observer status*in 2009 as well as in 2011. In 2013, however,
at the Council’s Kiruna meeting, a relatively positive decision was taken concerning
the application: although the EU still was not granted official observer status, it
was given the right to observe the AC’s meetings as an ‘‘observer in principle.’’1
The most recent AC ministerial meeting, held in Iqaluit, Canada, in April 2015,
suggests another 2 years of deferral of its formal observer status to the Council.2
Why should the Council be unwilling to formally endorse the EU as an observer?
The most obvious answer to the question is that Canada has been unwilling to do so.
At the Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna in 2013, Canada was backed by Russia in its
efforts to oppose EU observership.3 The reason for Canada’s reluctance is seemingly
the EU’s Seal Ban Regulation,4 which has aggrieved Canada, whose Inuit population
is clearly economically affected by the instrument. However, while Canada, at least
seemingly formally, had lifted its opposition at the 2015 AC ministerial meeting,
Russia’s opposition still led once more to a deferral of the EU becoming a formal
observer,5 and this is said to be due to the recent diplomatic battles between the
EU and Russia. In any case, although the EU is geographically linked to the Arctic
(in particular the European Arctic), Canada, Russia, and the United States generally
consider it an external player in the region.6 In particular, Russia has been tra-
ditionally sceptical of any external involvement in regional issues.7 Even though the
creation of the AC is a product of the post-Cold War era, tensions remain that make
Russia cautious despite its gradual engagement in many multilateral forums, such
as the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, and its recent membership in the WTO. With regard to external engagement
in Arctic affairs, especially with respect to the Arctic Ocean, Russia tends to view
matters as essentially pertaining to the coastal states only.8 As for the European
Arctic countries, on an official level they apparently view the EU’s engagement as
beneficial. However, the bilateral disagreement between the EU and Denmark seems
to have created some tension. Denmark’s willingness to have an independent Arctic
policy, and its distinct position within ‘‘the Arctic five’’ (the Arctic Ocean coastal
states) concerning the future management of living resources in the Arctic Ocean
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complicate its relationship with the EU.9 In addition, the EU’s failed fisheries
policy also makes EU’s engagement in the AC more complex. Moreover, internal
divergences exist among the various EU institutions in their positions towards
the Arctic. The European Parliament and the EU Commission, for example,
have exhibited incoherence in their positions, which at times makes the EU Arctic
policy clumsy.
Nevertheless, a number of EU states are active in the AC both as members and
as observers who are to some extent capable of representing EU voices in the AC.
However, because of the lack of vertical coherence between the national and EU
level, policy-making with respect to the Arctic leads to certain ‘‘implementation gaps
and opportunity losses.’’10 Although engagement, as an observer for example, would
arguably ensure a single unified position for the EU in Arctic matters on behalf of
its members, it has been claimed that such engagement would probably overlap with
the prevailing obligations of its members already on the Council.11 There is a risk
of having a multiplicity of voices making things complicated unless a Brussels-
based coordination is established with a view to benefiting both the EU itself and
its interested member states from the EU’s bilateral dialogues with Arctic states.
However, it is important to note that an observer in the AC is entitled to no more
than attending AC meetings and participating in projects at the working-group level.
Given the minimal scope of this role, one question to be set aside is whether the EU
has lost any influence by not being an ‘‘official’’ observer in the AC. Most likely it
has not. Rather, it can be said that the EU is capable of influencing the Arctic both as
a ‘‘semi-internal’’ and external actor through its various policies, including the use of
its market power. The Seal Ban Regulation is one case in which the EU has shown
its preparedness to use that power to influence events taking place in the Arctic.
Through similar measures, the EU can nudge the Arctic states in the direction it has
set for its Arctic policies, one being the protection of the region’s fragile ecosystem.12
The EU does not necessarily have to be connected to the AC to influence Arctic
policy given that actions such as these do not depend on its having any kind of formal
status in the AC. For example, the EU’s legitimate rights in the Arctic are set by
international law regardless of its engagement with the AC. Even though the coastal
states have set a ‘‘hegemonic role based on sovereign rights and regional presence’’13
as the ultimate criterion for regional membership in the AC, the Arctic marine
area as a whole is not merely a regional territory whose policies are determined by
the states that surround it. The EU role, regardless of its presence in the AC, can be
seen as complementary to that of the circumpolar states. Recent decades have seen
substantial cooperation arrangements concluded at various levels between the EU
and the Arctic states, and this cooperation is being improved on both the multilateral
and bilateral levels. In addition, all the Arctic states*as well as many non-Arctic
states/actors, such as Germany and the United Kingdom*have independently
articulated Arctic policies. In these policies, most of the Arctic states see the EU as a
cooperative partner in the promotion of Arctic-related matters with the EU’s
engagement viewed as complementary to the development taking place in the AC.
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Against this background, this article examines whether the policy responses of the
Arctic states with regard to the EU’s increased ambition to engage in Arctic matters
make it a legitimate actor or stakeholder in the Arctic. In this regard, the article
particularly explores the questions why and how the EU’s Arctic engagement with
corresponding policy responses from the Arctic states are set as plausible indicators
for its success in becoming a legitimate stakeholder in the Arctic. The analysis is
structured in six sections, including an introduction and conclusion. Section 2 gives
a brief overview of the prevailing Arctic challenges and the efforts undertaken by the
regional actors in addressing them. Section 3 then examines why the EU shows an
interest in Arctic affairs when it is not an Arctic actor in the ‘‘strict sense.’’ This is
followed by a section analysing how the EU has developed an Arctic policy as a semi-
legitimate Arctic actor. Section 5 goes on to examine the responses of the Arctic
states to this development in order to show in the conclusion that policy responses
from the Arctic states, except for some speculations from Canada and Russia, are
rather affirmative. Both the EU and the Arctic states maintain common objectives in
Arctic affairs, and their policies are thus complementary with a view to developing an
effective partnership and making the EU a legitimate stakeholder in the Arctic.
2. Prevailing challenges in the Arctic and the strengthened regional
cooperation
The transformation of the Arctic will be remarkable with the increasingly rapid effects
of climate change. The rise in temperature, which is twice as fast compared with the
rest of the world,14 will lead to melting of sea ice and glaciers15 at an ever-faster rate16,
resulting in an increase in numerous economic activities. As a result, the Arctic will
face both new challenges, such as environmental changes, and new opportunities, such
as large-scale trans-boundary economic activities. Environmental changes and large-
scale economic activities are interrelated in the region: the combined effects of the two
trends will be the gradual rise of industrial and commercial activities accompanied
by extensive developments in infrastructure that will cause significant societal changes.
A concomitant, far-reaching, and adverse consequence of the trends is the serious
threat they pose to the overall management of the Arctic ecosystems. It is important
to note in this regard that the region is home to a significant number of indigenous
and coastal communities that will face extreme challenges, for their livelihoods depend
on the unique Arctic environment.
As one would expect, it is the Arctic states that are most concerned about the
overall changes in the region. Although in the past decades, the Arctic was considered
a peripheral region, one not deserving of much international attention, it started to
be of concern at the end of 1980s, which marked the beginning of international
cooperation among the Arctic states. The first step in that process of international
cooperation was the adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)
in 199117 with a view to cooperating in matters of common interest, such as the
protection of the Arctic environment throughout the region. However, a significant
transformation occurred in this institutional framework between 1996 and 1998 with
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the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996, a body to promote stronger
intergovernmental cooperation among the eight Arctic states. This transformation
facilitated the merger of AEPS into the AC policy platform.18 The AC’s stated mission
is to: ‘‘promot[e] cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States
. . . on common Arctic issues, in particular [on] issues of sustainable development and
environmental protection in the Arctic.’’ The Council today has become the most
relevant institution in the circumpolar North. It is an organisation sui generis in that
it is not purely intergovernmental but also includes a number of non-state actors,
particularly indigenous groups.19 The latter actors, who have the status of ‘‘permanent
participant,’’ have an opportunity to make their voices heard in the decision-making
process.20 While today the Arctic can be seen as an institutionalised regional political
community in which states and non-state actors cooperate within the region towards
shared and legitimate objectives with a greater degree of integration,21 the AC is
neither bound by any treaty nor can it adopt any legally binding treaty by itself.22 It
falls somewhere between an intergovernmental forum and a regional organisation in
its ability to cooperate with actors both within and beyond the region.
3. Why is the EU interested in the Arctic?
No doubt, an interest in natural resources is one of the motivating factors for the EU’s
increasing readiness to engage in Arctic affairs. The EU is particularly dependent upon
the oil and natural gas produced in the region, in particular in Norway and in Russia.
It has other commercial interests there as well. The EU is the world’s largest single
market. Not only is it an important trading partner for the Arctic states, but it also
cooperates with its northern partners in exploring and establishing new transport
routes to facilitate trade and business. For example, the EU has developed the Galileo
satellite programme, which, among its other capabilities, enables tracking of transport
routes in the Arctic.23 Today, the European Parliament is also a full member of the
Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR),24 which played an
important role in establishing the AC and which actively deals with a number of items
on the Arctic agenda, including shipping, education and research, human develop-
ment, and climate change. Although it is true that there are multiple economic and
commercial considerations in the EU’s Arctic policy, it is equally true that climate
change mitigation and the protection of the Arctic environment are its primary focus,
inasmuch as it is committed to the fight against global climate change. On balance, the
EU’s engagement in the Arctic is based on a paradoxical platform of economic and
environmental interests: it seeks to further resource-related and commercial interests
on the one hand, and to protect the Arctic environment on the other.
3.1. Resource and commercial interests
The EU has significant resource interests in the marine areas of the Arctic waters.
Accordingly, the EU maintains close ties with the Arctic states, in particular with its
neighbours in the European High North. Shipping and transportation, as well as the
supply of living and non-living resources, such as fisheries and oil and gas, play an
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important role in the EU’s trade relations with the Arctic. In the area of shipping,
Europe controls 40% of the world’s merchant fleet,25 and European shipping com-
panies have strong interests in safe and expeditious transportation routes that may
also save time and energy. Even though it has been observed that development of
new Arctic shipping routes will probably be slow,26 it should be noted that transport
of oil and gas from Arctic Russia and Norway has significantly increased in recent
years.27 The majority of this maritime traffic is to ports in the EU. In addition, the
EU offshore drilling companies, shipping companies engaged in resource transporta-
tion, as well as increasing cruise ship and tourism activities are of significance for the
EU’s Arctic interests.
Concerning living and non-living resources, the EU is highly dependent on the
Arctic as far as fisheries and oil and gas resources are concerned. Approximately one-
third of the fish caught in the Arctic is consumed in the EU.28 The EU cooperates
with states that have sovereignty over or jurisdiction in Arctic waters, seeking not
only to safeguard fishing opportunities but also to guarantee long-term conservation
and optimum utilisation of fishery resources by ensuring that the best scientific
evidence available is heeded and proper precautionary approaches are used.29 The
EU’s most important resource interest, however, centres on Arctic hydrocarbons,
on which it is highly dependent.30 As a region, the Arctic is relatively peaceful and
stable compared with the Middle East. Since the EU intends to diversify its energy
supply to ensure energy security, it is constantly looking for additional sources of
energy. Arctic oil and gas have already proven substantial for the EU. One-fourth of
the oil and gas from the Arctic is consumed by the EU. The Barents Sea has been
presented as a new oil and gas province that could contribute significantly to the
EU energy market.31 In its communications with the EU, Norway has stressed
two aspects of energy in the High North.32 First, the resource potential in the area
is significant: the Barents Sea might become Europe’s new energy province.
Second, Norway is a stable energy supplier in an unstable world, offering secure
and predictable conditions for international companies operating on the Norwegian
continental shelf.
3.2. Stewardship
Combating climate change: Although the resource and commercial interests of the
EU in the Arctic are apparent, in almost all of its policy documents the EU has also
highlighted its role as a global leader in combating climate change, which is affecting
the Arctic drastically. The EU is thus assuming responsibility for protecting and
preserving the unique Arctic environment. The melting of Arctic sea ice as a con-
sequence of a rise in temperatures has proven to have repercussions in other parts of
the world, as global sea levels are on the rise. It has been observed that between 2003
and 2008, melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet contributed to over 40% of this rise.33
Since emission of greenhouse gases contributes to increases in temperature, the EU
has incorporated into law its commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
by 20% by 2020 and is committed to a long-term target of reducing emissions by
8095% by 2050. The EU’s economic interests in the Arctic thus have to be
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compatible with its climate policy. The Arctic states and the EU have a shared
interest in ensuring sustainable utilisation of the Arctic’s natural resources on land, in
the sea, and on or under the seabed. As part of promoting sustainable management
of Arctic natural resources, the EU emphasises the utilisation of new technology and
the creation of a knowledge base so that opportunities do not come at the expense of
observing the highest environmental standards; in other words, any activity to be
initiated must be based upon the best scientific findings available.
Although the EU’s gradually increasing energy demand and import of energy from
the Arctic runs counter to its emission reduction target, the community nonetheless
strongly emphasises the integration of energy and climate policy both internally
and externally. The EU aims at decarbonising its energy market by 2050 and by that
time increasing the proportion of renewables in its energy mix to 5597%.34
To achieve this target, the EU will have to substantially decrease its reliance on fossil
fuels by acting responsibly for sustainable energy development. As mentioned
previously, a large proportion of EU energy imports comes from Russia, whose
emission reduction target is more modest than that of the EU. Russia has committed
itself to emission reductions of 1015% below 1990 levels by 2020, which means a
3035% increase over 2007 levels, and to using 4.5% renewables in its energy mix by
2020.35 The EU is committed to taking effective actions to strike a balance between
its internal decarbonisation policy and an external actor’s (Russia’s) domestic policy
based on fossil fuels. It is argued that ecological or environmental constraints
on energy policy should be made integral and explicit in the EU-Russia energy
dialogue in order to achieve sustainable and climate-friendly energy development in
the Arctic.36
Protection of the rights of indigenous peoples: Not only does the EU play a major
role in climate change, but it is also a major player in international cooperation,
norm building, and policy setting where the rights of the indigenous peoples are
concerned. The EU policy documents concerning the Arctic repeatedly draw
attention to the region’s inhabitants, including its significant number of indigenous
peoples. The EU also assumes responsibility for its only indigenous community, the
Sa´mi, who inhabit EU territory in the northern part of Finland and Sweden as well
as other territories (northern Norway and the northwestern part of Russia in the
Kola Peninsula). According to the Treaty on European Union, the Union is founded
on, among other principles, the value of respect for human dignity and respect for
human rights, including rights of persons belonging to minorities.37 The EU aims to
develop this value as part of an advanced system of fundamental rights.38 In June
2012, the EU adopted the Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy39
which emphasises the promotion of human rights across all EU levels. The rights
of indigenous peoples with regard to their culture, livelihood, and participation in
any decisions that affect them are a core value for EU policy goals as well as for
sustainable resource and ecosystem management in the Arctic. While the EU does
not have any authority to enforce its policies beyond its territory, its external policies
have significant implications for the rights of indigenous peoples. The EU seeks to
integrate human rights into all aspects of its external policies prioritising the
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promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples across the globe,40
particularly with regard to guaranteeing their full participation and free, prior, and
informed consent in decision-making processes that affect them.41 The EU promotes
constitutional norms, such as the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, and
democracy in its international relations with other regional actors.42
The EU has itself developed a number of documents concerning the protection
and promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples. Some of these documents set
out the EU’s support for the promotion of human rights and democracy in third
countries which are not developing countries.43 Ever since, the EU has progressed with
substantial improvements concerning indigenous peoples’ issues. These improve-
ments are reflected both in its human rights policies and in its development policies.
In the framework of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR), a project has been established to aid Arctic and sub-Arctic indigenous
peoples in pursuing traditional livelihoods, which is viewed as a means to strengthen
capacity building in Russia. These relations have been institutionalised to some extent
through the CPAR or within the BEAC (Working Group of Indigenous Peoples
and the Barents Indigenous Peoples’ Office).44 It has been argued*particularly in the
opinion provided by the Arctic indigenous peoples, the Inuit, for example*that the
EU Seal Ban Regulation of 2010 represents a major setback in respecting the value
of indigenous culture and cultural rights. The EU nevertheless remains committed
to preserving and protecting the rights of the indigenous peoples of the region; to
supporting, respecting, and promoting their self-development; to ensuring their
effective participation in all stages where their interests are involved; and to enhancing
their capabilities to develop free and prior informed consent in matters affecting them.
The aforementioned EU documents also recognise the key role played by indigenous
peoples in the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. The recently
adopted Council Conclusion reiterates the EU’s commitment to increased dialogue
with the indigenous peoples of the region in order to explore appropriate ways of
ensuring that the representatives of Arctic indigenous peoples are informed and
consulted on EU policies that may affect them.45 Moreover, the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) contains a set of rules to which the EU
has given strong support.46
4. EU Policy towards the Arctic
In practice, the EU started developing an Arctic policy in March 2008 with ‘‘Climate
Change and International Security,’’ a document endorsed by the European Com-
mission.47 This document highlighted the increasing geopolitical importance of
the Arctic resulting mainly from the melting of the polar ice cap, which had increased
access to Arctic waters. Prior to that, in 2007, the Commission Communication ‘‘An
Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union’’ cited the importance of the
Arctic Ocean.48 The Action Plan for Integrated Maritime Policy included prepara-
tion of a report by 2008 on Arctic Ocean strategic issues that would lay the founda-
tion for decisions on European interests in the Arctic waters and the EU’s response
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in that regard.49 Concrete developments in Arctic policy started with a resolution of
the European Parliament in October 2008 on Arctic governance, with a proposal for
negotiating an international treaty. However, the proposal has attracted harsh criticism
from most, if not all, of the Arctic countries. Later, in November, the Commission
adopted the Communication ‘‘The European Union and the Arctic Region,’’ which
deleted the reference to any Arctic treaty solution. There has since been a series of
other documents adopted by EU institutions showing the EU’s great concern for
and stewardship role in the preservation and protection of the Arctic environment.
Although EU policy development with regard to the Arctic is ongoing,50 three issue
areas have been highlighted from the very beginning for the future strategies:
protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population, promoting
sustainable use of resources, and contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral
governance.51 These policy documents suggest that the EU has moved from its
position*from its traditional approach of being politically uninvolved in the region*
to becoming more engaged, and from seeking a treaty-based solution to supporting
the Arctic states’ approach to governance with stronger emphasis on the UNCLOS.
It has thus certainly entered into an area heavily dominated by sovereign nation states,
in particular the Arctic coastal states. Since the Arctic remains dominated by the
coastal states, for the EU to have any role to play requires partnership relations with
the Arctic states.52
In sum, the EU documents set out the goal of sustainable Arctic development
where knowledge and responsibility are integrated. As the changing Arctic landscape,
new transport routes, and the increased navigation as well as exploration for and
exploitation of natural and mineral resources bring new economic life to the region, the
EU Arctic policies have addressed the potential risk for the fragile Arctic environment.
The EU Arctic policy thus puts an emphasis on cooperation and partnership with
the Arctic states through bilateral and institutional means. It highlights the impor-
tance of cooperation through legal and institutional mechanisms with a constructive
engagement with the Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and other partners to find
common solutions to challenges that require an international response. The EU also
recognises the legal framework of the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention and relevant
institutions such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
4.1. The EU and the Arctic: the question of legitimacy
The EU itself is not an Arctic actor in the ‘‘strict’’ geographical sense, nor is it
an ‘‘officially’’ designated observer in the main intergovernmental forum on Arctic
affairs, the Arctic Council.53 The EU has no territorial jurisdiction in the Arctic
Ocean, as neither of its Arctic members*Finland and Sweden*has a coastline,
but these states are members of the AC. Denmark is a member of the EU, and because
of its overseas territories, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, it is also a member of
the AC. However, the EU has no territorial jurisdiction over Denmark’s Arctic waters
since Greenland withdrew from the EU via a referendum held in 1982. It should be
noted, however, that Iceland and Norway are committed to many EU regulations
through the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement having as much effect as they
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do in EU member states.54 Thus, the EU is in one way or another directly linked to
five of the eight Arctic states. The EU has several bilateral and regional cooperation
agreements with the other three states (Canada, Russia, and the United States) that
allow it to engage in various regional matters. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council
(BEAC) and the Northern Dimension Policy initiative are important in this regard.
Moreover, seven other EU countries are officially designated as observers in the
AC. Thus, the EU has geographical as well as political links to the region. In addition,
it is connected to the Arctic through history, culture, economy, and science.55 The EU
can be said to have at least a semi-direct subjectivity in Arctic matters because of its
Arctic links and the stewardship role it has assumed in protecting and preserving
the unique character of the Arctic environment. Although this sort of analogy may
offer some form of recognition where the EU’s Arctic competence is concerned, it
clearly does not constitute any real institutional presence for the EU as an integrated
Arctic actor. The role of the EU in the Arctic has to be examined also in terms of
the Union’s external policy, through which it influences Arctic matters in its relations
with the regional actors by diplomatic means.
4.2. The EU and the Arctic: developing interregional cooperation?
The Arctic coastal states’ regional presence and sovereignty do not necessarily
restrict the EU’s ‘‘legitimate actorness in Arctic affairs’’56 in relation to its capability
of influencing Arctic regional affairs. It should be noted that the Arctic is not a
geographically self-contained regime. It has to be defined in relational terms that take
into consideration the interaction between territorial and non-territorial actors.57
The Arctic marine area provides legitimate interests for actors or states other than
those regarded as strictly Arctic (e.g. fishing in the high seas or navigation through a
country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)).
While the EU continues to struggle to define its international role and its identity
as an international actor, its support for regional integration elsewhere in the world to
promote inter-regional cooperation (or bloc-to-bloc diplomacy, rather than traditio-
nal state-to-state cooperation) has enhanced its status as an actor in international
relations.58 Promoting interregional cooperation allows the EU to pursue the larger
goal of influence as an international actor. Nevertheless, the EU’s foreign policy is
relatively new and the constitutional basis for the law governing the EU’s international
relations is fragmented.59,60 The EU has some 20 interregional agreements with other
major regional groupings globally. Through such agreements, the EU has been able
to influence the region by way of a dual strategy: on the one hand, it promotes
the preservation of the regional order with its fundamental characteristics; on the
other, it promotes adoption of certain practices, institutional arrangements, or other
forms of governance modelled on the European regional governance system, which
enhance the EU’s global presence in external affairs.61 However, the success of a
strategy designed to promote EU norms elsewhere depends upon the willingness of
the recipient regions to endorse these norms.62
As regards the Arctic, the AC cannot be compared with the groupings that exist in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America or groupings like G-77, with which the EU promotes
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interregional cooperation. The EU’s proximity to the Arctic, as it is inextricably
linked to the region by a unique combination of history, geography, economy,
and scientific achievements,63 allows it to build a stronger regional cohesion.
Even though the EU does not have any formal agreement with the AC similar to that
underpinning the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the EU Commission is a member
of both the BEAC, a regional cooperation body, and the Northern Dimension,64
a common policy of the EU, Iceland, Norway, and the Russian Federation, in which
the United States and Canada have observer status. These institutional arrange-
ments would surely provide the desired scope of regional cooperation between
the EU, on the one side, and the Arctic actors, on the other. In addition, the EU has
significant foreign policy dimensions in economic issues with the Arctic states.
Based on this sort of EUArctic engagement, the EU’s Arctic policies can be
viewed as somewhere between internal and external policies. Generally, the EU’s
external policies are designed to influence the politics and policies of states or regions
beyond the EU in two ways. The impacts of its policies can be driven, on the one hand,
by sanctions and/or rewards (what is known as the principle of consequence) or, on
the other, through intergovernmental interactions (bargaining or persuasion).65 Even
though the EU Seal Ban Regulation has had some repercussions, in particular for
relations between the EU and Canada, the development of EU relations with the
Arctic as a whole, as well as with individual states in the region, shows that the EU relies
mostly on its ‘‘soft power’’ resources in the promotion of partnership. Soft power,
as opposed to hard power, entails the use of attraction rather than coercion.66 In
other words, it is a matter of influencing through economic power.67 It is based on
co-options, in which partners are not forced to align but want to share the same goal,
values, and visions due to their perceived attractiveness.68 Since interregional
cooperation is heavily influenced by geopolitical interests,69 soft power can be
exercised by interregional cooperation between the two entities (the EU and the
Arctic region, the latter represented by the AC) in which the common objectives of
promoting fundamental values respecting human rights, the rule of law, and good
governance while securing economic interests are balanced. On several occasions,
high-profile senior EU officials have emphasised the use of the EU’s soft power in
external relations, including Arctic affairs.70 The most recent EU Council conclusion
on the Arctic suggests that the EU may contribute to the work of the AC by influencing
Canada.71 Specifically, it could tap the current positive momentum in EU-Canada
relations to help resolve remaining issues and thereby allow for full implementation
of the Kiruna decision regarding the EU’s observer status as soon as possible.72 It
should be noted that after the decision of the WTO dispute resolution panel in May
2014, the EU and Canada have progressed in reaching an agreement on the seal
ban issue. That coincided with the final stages of negotiations on the Canada-EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), where partners attempted
to resolve pertaining problematic issues, including the seal ban. As a result, a special
declaration on the seal trade is expected to be attached to the CETA, where it is likely
that the EU will clarify the exemption for traditional indigenous hunting and support
Canada in setting up a workable certification and labelling system for seal products
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that originate from traditional harvesting. At the same time, Canada has withdrawn
its objection to the ‘‘full implementation’’ of the decision made in the 2013 Kiruna
Ministerial Meeting on granting the EU observer status in the AC. However,
as mentioned, Russia’s objection in the Iqaluit meeting held in April 2015, which
stemmed from the crisis in Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions that the EU and
Russia have imposed on one another, caused another deferral of the EU’s official
observer status for 2 more years.
5. Policy responses from the Arctic states
The AC has not yet recognised the EU as a formal observer. However, the EU can
still observe AC meetings as an ‘‘observer in principle.’’ In May 2013, the Council
revised its rules of procedure,73 in fact abolishing the difference in status between
formal and ad-hoc observers. Accordingly, all current observers are potentially in the
same position as the EU, and observer status can also be revoked by the AC at its
discretion. Regardless of the AC’s collective acceptance of the EU as an observer,
its eight member states*the entire Council*have individually developed Arctic
policies, just as the EU has. These policies, despite some variation in approach, do
not represent extremely divergent views as regards welcoming the EU to become
involved in Arctic matters. Whereas the Nordic countries are far more open to EU
engagement, Canada, Russia, and the United States want to keep it to the minimum
possible.74 All these countries agree on the importance of the EU as an active partner
but nonetheless emphasise that the Arctic states should control the proceedings
in the AC.75 The European Parliament Magazine76 published the official statements
of some of the Arctic countries maintaining that EU engagement complements
the policies of the respective Arctic countries. All the European Arctic states except
Russia clearly stated that they want to see the EU as a close partner in Arctic
affairs.77,78
Amongst the Nordic countries, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark have been
supportive of the EU’s engagement in the Arctic for obvious reasons (their being
EU members). Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 201379 highlights the
importance of the EU formulating a policy towards the Arctic and the reinforcement
of its role in the region. One of the key priorities of the Finnish strategy is to support
the establishment of the EU’s Arctic Information Centre in conjunction with the
Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland.80 The process of preparing to establish
the information centre was begun by the EU Commission at the beginning of
2013. Sweden has fully agreed with the objectives set by the EU to promote an Arctic
agenda in its policies. Sweden reaffirmed the EU’s effective partnership by the
country’s involvement in the Northern Dimension along with Iceland, Norway, and
Russia; this engagement includes the Arctic as a top-priority area of cooperation.81
Norway has set the High North as its number one policy priority82 and encourages
partnership with the EU in that context. In 2011, Jonas Gahr Støre, the Norwegian
Foreign Minister, clearly welcomed the EU’s increased engagement in the Arctic and
the development of a EU Arctic policy. In his view, the European partners have a
K. Hossain
100
great deal to contribute as regards research and science, industry, trade, and financial
power.83 Norway firmly believes that international cooperation has to be developed if
the challenges in the Arctic are to be addressed and sustainable management of
natural resources ensured, and that the EU has the potential to make a contribution
in that regard.84 Greenland (even though it does not have a final say in Denmark’s
foreign policy but has been fully consulted) has taken a similar view and suggested
providing for the EU’s active participation in the work of the AC. Greenland finds
that such participation would provide a more reasoned approach to Arctic issues,
such as understanding the importance of protecting traditional lifestyles, the role
of marine mammals, and human development issues. At a bilateral level, however,
there have been some disagreements between the EU and Denmark (Greenland).
Concerns regarding the vote on the ban on trade in polar bear accessories at the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) in Bangkok in
2013, and Denmark’s support for the increase in quotas for aboriginal Greenlandic
whaling in the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in the same year caused
some tensions in its relations with the EU. Denmark even threatened to leave the
IWC. The decision was later revised as a number of positive responses have been
received in support of aboriginal subsistence whaling in Greenland.85 In March
2015, the EU signed a Joint Declaration with the Government of Greenland and the
Government of Denmark on relations between the EU and Greenland to further
strengthen their relations and cooperation based on broadly shared interests, to the
mutual benefit of their peoples, and to endow their mutual relations with a long-term
perspective.86 As a quasi-independent country, Greenland needs foreign investment
for its economic development. The EU can obviously be an important partner
and player in the region, one that may contribute to research, transport, energy,
climate change, and cooperation in international arenas.87 Another member of the
AC*Iceland*has expressed its support for EU engagement in the Arctic, citing
the mutually beneficial role for both the EU and the Arctic states. It supported the
EU’s application to become a formal observer in the AC prior to the AC’s Kiruna
Ministerial Meeting.88
In the North American Arctic, Canada’s policy towards the Arctic is the top
priority. Canada’s view is clear and focused squarely on sovereignty, sovereign rights,
and jurisdiction in the Arctic through which the Arctic states exercise leadership
in the management of the region. It sees a need for strengthening the capacity of
the AC.89 Although Canada and the EU work together in the area of Arctic science and
research as well as through the Northern Dimension policy, to which Canada is an
observer, Canada is not content with the EU’s position on the issue of the Northwest
Passage. The EU, along with the United States and a number of other countries,
does not accept Canada’s claim of the passage as internal waters.90 In addition,
Canada’s discontent concerning the EU regulation banning trade in seal products
brought some unease in the relations between Canada and the EU. Canada maintains
the view that the ban on seal products was a political decision that has no basis in
fact or in science.91 While technically, through an exemption clause, the regulation
allows the country’s Inuit to place seal products on the EU market, the Inuit hunters
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maintain that the ban has destroyed the industry and caused demand for the products
to evaporate globally.92 The matter apparently disturbed Canada and is the reason
why it has vetoed the EU’s application for observership in the AC. On the contrary,
US Arctic policy, which is a low-priority issue in US foreign policy, took a more
conciliatory stance than Canada,93 and seeks to cooperate with both Arctic and non-
Arctic states and actors by developing a strengthened partnership through existing
international forums and legal frameworks. To the extent that the partnership seeks
to advance shared objectives in order to protect Arctic states’ national interests
and resources, the United States sees no significant challenges to engagement on the
part of external actors, including the EU.94 Besides, the United States sees an added
value in the EU’s engagement for enhanced support for scientific cooperation and,
to some extent, building a partnership with the EU on environmental issues.95 On the
issue of the Northwest Passage, the United States even aligns itself with the position
of the EU.
In the case of Russia, the country’s ambitious economic projects direct it to
cooperate with the EU despite the former’s prevailing scepticism. Geographically,
Russia accounts for the largest proportion of the Arctic, including almost half of
the Arctic Ocean. It is estimated that up to 90% of the hydrocarbon reserves found
on the entire Russian continental shelf lie in the Arctic, with 66.5% located in its
western part in the Barents and Kara Seas.96 The demand for Russia’s hydrocarbon
resources on the EU market is on the rise; it is argued, however, that this demand is
probably not as great as Russia’s need for the EU energy market.97 Russia, thus,
has an interest in maintaining the region as an area of international cooperation and
in preserving its most important asset as the country’s future economic engine.98 So
far, Russia is the only country in the world with which the EU holds biannual
summits, a degree of engagement that is meant to reflect the importance that the
EU accords to its relationship with its biggest neighbour in the Arctic.99 It is yet to be
seen how the EU-Russia business relationship will be impacted by the souring
of relations in recent months. The downturn was sparked by Russia’s takeover of
Crimea and the subsequent political unrest in Ukraine as well as the death of around
300 people in the crash of Malaysian Airlines MH17 over rebel-held Ukraine,
allegedly supported by Russia. The situation has further deteriorated with the
sanctions imposed upon Russia and countersanctions imposed upon the EU and
others by Russia, despite EU companies (e.g. BP, British Petroleum) being con-
cerned about the adverse effects of sanctions on their business with Russia.100
The sanctions, related to the oil and gas sector, among others, will prevent future
investments by European corporate agents in the Russian fossil fuel sectors directly
affecting Arctic-related developments.
Although apparently all eight Arctic states see involvement of the EU in the Arctic
as a partnership project to promote an Arctic agenda, they nonetheless have never
recognised the EU as a forerunner in Arctic governance, nor have they accepted the
EU as a legitimate ‘‘stakeholder’’ in the Arctic.101 The implementation of the EU’s
Arctic policy is possible to the extent the Arctic states consider this relevant to and
legitimate for their own interests. In a statement in 2012 in response to a vote by
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the European Parliament’s Environmental Committee in favour of a moratorium on
Arctic drilling, Per Rune Henriksen, the deputy oil and energy minister of Norway,
stated that the EU is ‘‘free to argue what it wants . . .’’ but also highlighted that the
EU does not have any jurisdiction in the Arctic, and none of its member countries
has continental shelf in the region.102 According to Henriksen, the clear position of
the Norwegian government is that it does not consider the measures by the EU to be
of relevance for Norway.103 Similarly, the 2014 European Parliament’s resolution*
the EU Strategy for the Arctic,104 which has proposed the development of a network
of Arctic conservation areas and, in particular, the protection of the international sea
area around the North Pole outside the economic zones of the coastal states*can
only be implemented when the Arctic states, or at least the five coastal states, agree to
adopt binding measures. As a result, even though the Arctic countries have clearly
recognised EU policies as complementing the strategies of the Arctic states, the EU
needs to convince them*in particular the Arctic Five, the five Arctic coastal states*
of its rationale for implementing the EU’s policies in the region.105 However, the
Arctic states must recognise the legitimate interests of other states or actors and their
role in Arctic governance. Given that all the current formal observers in the AC are
potentially in the same position as the EU, it has been argued that they are sitting in
an ‘‘ejector seat.’’106 Unless the Arctic states carefully acknowledge the observers’
legitimate roles and interests, only informal pressure can be placed on the AC.
In case of any rejection by the AC members of the involvement of the other actors in
a matter in which they have a stake, these actors or the group of observers could
take up Arctic issues together in another forum outside the AC. In such an extreme
case, it is argued, the EU could be in a favourable position to set up such a forum,
as it is already very active in regional cooperation on Arctic-related issues, for
example, through the BEAC, of which the EU is a member, and the Northern
Dimension, a common policy framework in which the EU participates along with
Iceland, Norway, and Russia.107
6. Conclusion
The EU’s competence in the Arctic is neither purely internal nor purely external. It is
somewhere in between. While the Arctic states do not tend to recognise the EU as a
legitimate actor in the region, lacking as it does sovereignty and regional presence,
they nevertheless do not deny its importance in the promotion of an Arctic agenda.
Given that the Arctic states and the EU are pursuing common objectives*protecting
the Arctic environment and its ecosystems and the rights of its inhabitants, including
indigenous peoples*whatever competence the EU does have, its policies comple-
ment those of the Arctic states. These objectives of EU Arctic policy are perceived as
less controversial and understood as being of strategic importance for both the EU
and its Arctic partners seeking to establish cooperation. It is also important to note
that, in its policy documents, the EU has also clearly recognised the Arctic states’
forum*the Arctic Council*as the primary body for dealing with Arctic matters.
Although observer status in the AC will not bring any substantial change in the
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implementation of the EU’s policies in the Arctic, the new developments in observer
status suggest that as an ‘‘observer in principle’’ the EU’s status is not inferior to that
of the other observers. Moreover, regardless of its engagement in the AC, the EU
assumes legitimate rights set by international law. Its engagement in the regional
affairs through other means, such as by virtue of its membership in the BEAC as
well as in the Northern Dimension policy, makes it a relevant regional actor, if not
probably a powerful one; yet it may employ its soft power in policy implementation.
Although EU policy-making with respect to the Arctic still needs some degree of
coordination within the EU’s various institutions, with the Arctic players, as well as
with other decision makers from areas such as business, economy, science, and civil
society, the findings of this article suggest that the EU’s ambition to be a relevant
stakeholder in the Arctic corresponds thus far with the policy goals set by the Arctic
states for developing a partnership with the EU, at least to the extent their formal
official statements are concerned.
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